In many countries, capital 
usually adjust to those in the other with some time delay. This has been termed by Garbade and Silber (1979) as a dominant-satellite market relationship; the former is a satellite and the latter is dominant. While multiple exchanges create a competitive landscape, they can also lead to fragmented liquidity and diseconomies in operations. A key consideration in evaluating public policy toward the structure of the exchange industry is the relative role of satellite exchanges in the country's capital markets, particularly in creating a competitive environment.
There are three stock exchanges in Pakistan: Karachi, Lahore, and Islamabad. The Karachi Stock exchange (KSE) dominates all trading activity, while the Lahore Stock Exchange (LSE) and Islamabad Stock Exchange (ISE) account for a smaller share of the total volume. This study examines the role of the LSE relative to the KSE in its basic function as a stock exchange. Its performance is assessed in terms of relative efficiency in processing information (market efficiency), cost of intermediation (transaction costs), role in price discovery, and the extent of market integration through the flow of information.
The study was conducted against the background of ongoing efforts to demutualize the country's three stock exchanges. Currently, they are structured as mutual nonprofit companies owned by members who have the exclusive right to trade on the exchanges. The proposed restructuring will convert the exchanges to shareholder-owned for-profit corporations. Subsequently, the three exchanges may be consolidated into one corporate entity. An assessment of the LSE's relative role should provide insight into whether or not public interest is best served by the contemplated consolidation of the three stock exchanges.
The remainder of this section will provide an overview of the three stock exchanges and we examine various issues relating to the performance of the stock exchanges. Section II presents a review of the literature, and Section III provides empirical evidence of the LSE's performance, describes the data and econometric methodology used, and records the results achieved. Section IV concludes the findings of this study.
B. Overview of Stock Exchanges: Structure and Governance
The three stock exchanges in Pakistan are based in Karachi, Islamabad, and Lahore, and were established in 1949 , 1970 , and 1989 They are served by a national clearing and settlement system, a central depository company, and two rating agencies. A brief statistical overview of the three stock exchanges is provided in Table- 1. Together, they list about 700 of the approximately 2,800 registered public companies in Pakistan. In addition to corporations, a number of nonbank financial institutions (NBFIs) are also listed on the exchanges; these include 54 insurance companies, 40 mutual funds, 5 development financial institutions, 8 investment banks, and 20 leasing companies. There is a substantial overlap in the listing of companies: most companies are listed on all three exchanges except for 116 that are listed solely on the KSE, 5 that are listed solely on the LSE, and 1 listed solely on the ISE. The KSE functions as the dominant exchange in terms of listings, market capitalization, volume of trading, and new listings. The regional stock exchanges have been losing their market share over time. In 2003, the KSE's share was over 81% of the volume traded, followed by the LSE accounting for 17%, and the ISE accounting for 2%. As Table- 1 shows, the shares of the LSE and ISE had declined to 9.2% and 0.4%, respectively, by the end of 2007/08.
All three exchanges are privately owned and are mutual nonprofit organizations owned by about 300 broker members (each exchange has a membership maximum limit of 200, the difference being accounted for by overlapping members and brokers). The exchanges are registered as companies limited by guarantee and are licensed by the Securities Exchange Commission of Pakistan (SECP). A mutual form means that, by acquiring membership of an exchange (by purchasing a "card" or "seat"), the party obtains membership of as well as the right to trade on the exchange, subject to regulations. The difference from a corporate form is that the latter separates ownership from trading rights. As noted above, all three exchanges are in the process of being demutualized and subsequently corporatized. A draft ordinance, the Stock Exchanges (Corporatization, Demutualization and Integration) Ordinance 2007 was approved by the Government of Pakistan's federal cabinet in January 2008, which has yet to be voted on by the National Assembly.
1 The Ordinance provides a road map for converting the stock exchanges to corporations and a mechanism to facilitate the integration of these exchanges in that any two or more may file a scheme of integration for approval by the SECP.
The SECP is responsible primarily for regulating and supervising stock exchanges. However, the three stock exchanges are also frontline selfregulatory organizations (SROs) that deal with the listing of securities, admission of trading members, market surveillance, and broker conduct.
C. Stock Exchanges: Concerns and Issues
In order to render the capital market as a major source of long-term finance in Pakistan, the country's stock exchanges need to undergo further institutional and regulatory development. There should be a higher trading volume in more stocks, with more stocks participating in market moves (implying greater market breadth). The capacity to execute large buy-andsell orders without significant price movements (market liquidity and depth) also needs to be enhanced. Market breadth and depth can be improved by broadening the investor base, bringing in new financing instruments, and developing NBFIs as key players in the securities market.
The SECP (2004) has examined various problems related to the working of the stock exchanges and concluded that a "mutual structure and fragmented market are at the heart of problem being faced by the stock market…. Fragmentation of market place has added to cost inefficiencies for all stakeholders. Because of the mutual structure the reforms in the past have not made substantial impact."
According to the Asian Development Bank (ADB) (2007), a key issue that relates more directly to the working of the stock exchanges is market fragmentation:
"Although the vast majority of listed securities are traded on more than one exchange in Pakistan, the market remains fragmented, which undermines its efficiency, particularly with regard to price discovery and investor confidence. This is mainly due to weak linkages between the exchanges. The three exchanges do not have any systematic exchange of price and other information. Self-regulation of the exchanges is weak, and no mechanism is in place to coordinate inter-market surveillance and development of a plan for sharing self-regulatory responsibilities. Brokers are not required to execute orders of their clients in the best interests of the latter in a fair and transparent manner. Due to lack of price information from other exchanges, brokers are often not in the position to avail of quotations from other exchanges." ADB (2007) further suggests that there are two options for strengthening investor protection and efficiency of the market and increasing transparency: (i) merge the three exchanges, or (ii) strengthen linkages between exchanges to achieve a unified national market system in securities. ADB (2007) goes on to say that: "The second is more realistic under the present circumstances." SECP (2004) , on the other hand advances both demutualization and integration as a remedy for the problems faced by the exchanges.
Both ADB (2007) and SECP (2004) seem to suggest that (i) the existence of multiple exchanges fragments the market and liquidity, increasing the cost of intermediation; (ii) the LSE and ISE cannot compete effectively with the KSE; and (iii) the LSE and ISE are not playing their economic role of price discovery and market making. The reports' conclusions are based on stakeholder surveys and are not supported by rigorous statistical analysis. This paper purports to provide econometric evidence on these issues.
D. Issues of Performance
The literature on financial markets presents no unanimously agreed measure of the performance and quality of services of a stock exchange. Researchers have focused on the different characteristics of markets, such as liquidity, informational efficiency, and volatility as criteria for market quality comparisons. Another approach has been to judge the quality of the exchanges' services based on transaction costs. In this study, we focus on an econometric analysis of four key aspects of the functioning of the LSE and KSE: (i) informational efficiency, (ii) comparative transaction costs, (iii) the role of the exchanges in price discovery, and (iv) market integration through the inter-exchange of information.
II. Review of the Literature
A number of studies have examined the relative contribution of US regional exchanges to the price discovery of stocks trading on the national exchanges, which have a bearing on our study of the LSE's role. These studies generally support the view that regional exchanges do play a role, albeit a minor one, in the price discovery process. 2 We start with an overview of some of the research carried out in this area. Garbade and Silber (1979) suggest the terminology "dominant" and "satellite" markets, and analyze trading patterns on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and Pacific and Midwest regional exchanges. Their data consists of the time (truncated to the nearest minute) and price of every transaction in the stocks of five firms executed for 2 months, August 1973 and September 1975. They conclude that the regional exchanges are "satellites, but not pure satellites." Their results indicate that the price of transactions on regional exchanges contain information relevant for NYSE traders, i.e., at times, their prices contain new information not already included in the NYSE's earlier prices. This suggests that the advent of the consolidated tape permits information content embedded in regional prices to channel back into the dominant market. However, they find that this did not lead to a complete integration of the NYSE and regional exchanges.
In 1975, the US Congress decided to integrate the trading of major securities across markets, which led to the development of several electronic systems designed to integrate the trading of NYSE-listed stocks. Blume and Goldstein (1979) examine the impact of this mandate by analyzing individual quote and transaction records for 2,023 corporations for a 12-month period ending June 1995. The study finds that "most of the time, the NYSE quote matches or determines the best displayed quote, and the NYSE is the most frequent initiator of quote changes. Non-NYSE markets attracted a significant portion of their volume even when they were posting inferior bids or offers, indicating they obtained order flow for other reasons, such as 'payment for order flow.' Yet, when a non-NYSE market does post a better bid or offer, it does attract additional order flow." Thus, the electronic systems provide only a partial integration of markets. Harris, et al (1995) show how regional exchanges in the US contribute to the price discovery process. Using 1-year's transaction data for IBM, the heaviest traded stock for the year, from the New York, Pacific, and Midwest stock exchanges, they form matched trade tuples to ensure synchronicity, to the effect that the time elapsed between the first recorded price and last recorded price in the tuple has a mean value of 102 seconds. Using an error correction model, the paper demonstrates that equilibrium IBM prices are also established by information revealed on the Midwest and Pacific exchanges. All three markets react to independent information reflected in each exchange's prices. Harris, et al (1995) report that not only do prices on the Pacific and Midwest exchanges respond to deviations from NYSE prices, but that NYSE prices also respond to deviations from prices on regional exchanges, although to a smaller extent. This paper follows the methodology developed by Hasbrouck (1995) to estimate the LSE's information share in price discovery (Section III). Hasbrouck (1995) considers 30 stocks in the Dow Jones industrial average for the period August-October 1993. NYSE bid-and-offer quotes and the best non-NYSE bid-and-offer quotes from all quotes reported on the consolidated tape are used with 1-second time resolution. Price discovery appears to be concentrated at the NYSE; the median information share of NYSE is 92.7 percent. Thus, there is empirical evidence that some price discovery takes place on regional exchanges as well. The study also finds a significant positive correlation between the NYSE contribution to price discovery and its market share. However, for 28 of the 30 Dow stocks, the NYSE's information share is larger than its share of the trading volume in stocks, suggesting that regional markets partly appropriate the informational value of prices determined on the NYSE. Eun and Sabherwal (2003) explore the extent to which US stock exchanges contribute to the price discovery of Canadian stocks traded on the Toronto Stock Exchange (TSE) and cross-listed on US exchanges, the NYSE, American Stock Exchange (AMEX), or NASDAQ. The study covers a 6-month period in 1998 using all intra-day quotes for 62 Canadian firms, excluding thinly traded firms. The study finds that prices on the TSE and US exchanges are cointegrated and mutually adjusting, i.e., "not only do the US prices adjust to the TSE prices, but they also provide feedback so that the TSE prices adjust to the U.S. prices." The US exchange contribution to the discovery of Canadian stocks ranges from 0.2 percent to 98.2 percent, with an average of 38.1 percent. The extent of the US stock exchange's contribution is directly related to its share of trading and to the proportions of informative trades. Arnold, et al (1999) describes how the role of regional exchanges has changed from being venues for listing local securities to that of more direct competitors for the order flow of NYSE listings. This competition has led to mergers between regional exchanges in the US, and increased their ability to compete with the NYSE. The study uses monthly data for the period March 1945 to October 1953 on the dollar market share of the stock exchanges. The authors find that merging exchanges were able to increase their market share and lower the bid-ask spread. The empirical evidence suggests that regional exchanges survived because they were better able to reduce order fragmentation and achieve economies of scale.
While multiple exchanges create a competitive landscape, they also lead to fragmented liquidity and diseconomies in operations. Hamilton (1979) studies the fragmentation and competitive effects of trading NYSElisted stocks on the regional exchanges (off-board trading). The study compares specialist spreads and the daily stock returns variance for a random sample of 315 NYSE-listed stock issues, based on quarterly observations for four quarters ending in March 1975. Hamilton (1979) finds that the competitive effect exceeds the fragmentation effect, i.e., the competitive effect tends to reduce both the NYSE specialist spreads and daily stock variances by more than the degree to which the fragmentation effect tends to increase them. Both these effects are, however, small, implying that offboard trading seems to have limited policy importance. Nevertheless, the author concludes that for "the present level of off-board trading, such a policy would seem to have precedence over a policy that protects exchange efficiency by restricting off-board trading."
The emergence of electronic communication networks (ECNs) also points to the possible value-added role that off-board trading may play. Huang (2000) examines price discovery by ECNs and NASDAQ market makers. The study uses quoted data for July 1998 using a 1-minute time interval. The use of quoted data minimizes the problems of infrequent trading and that associated with aligning data across dealers. The results show that ECNs are important contributors to the price discovery process. Further analysis suggests that ECNs' share of price discovery is enhanced by informed traders who prefer to trade anonymously, but is reduced by transactions by liquidity traders seeking lower trading costs.
While there is empirical evidence on the contributions of the US's regional exchanges, researchers have also noted certain negative aspects. Lee (1993) finds that, for NYSE-listed securities, the prices at which comparable orders are executed differ systematically by the exchange at which they are executed. The data used in this study consist of all trades and quotes for NYSE-and AMEX-listed firms, stamped to the nearest second, for 1988/89. The findings suggest that order flow may follow cash inducements (i.e., payment for order flow) rather than the best price execution.
3 These intermarket price differences depend on trade size-with the smallest trades exhibiting the biggest per share price difference-and raise questions about the adequacy of the existing inter-market trading system (ITS), the broker's fiduciary responsibility for "best execution" and the propriety of order-flow inducements.
Findings such as Lee's (1993) have led to allegations that diverting order flows to regional markets is used to "cream-skim" uninformed liquidity trades, leaving information-based trades to established markets. Easley, Kiefer, and O'Hara (1996) test this hypothesis using a sample of stocks known to be used in order purchase agreements that trade on the NYSE and Cincinnati Stock Exchange. They select the 30 most actively traded stocks on Cincinnati and use both intra-day and inter-day trade data for a 60-day period in 1990. Their main empirical result is that there is a significant difference in the information content of orders executed in New York and Cincinnati, and that this difference is consistent with creamskimming. By cream skimming the order flow, regional markets can exacerbate the fragmentation problem and undermine the viability of old markets and the trading process itself. Given widespread allegations of broker manipulations in Pakistan, the possibility of cream-skimming cannot be ruled out.
III. Empirical Evidence

A. Sample and Data
Our empirical analysis is based on a direct comparison between stocks that trade on the KSE as well the LSE. Our sample consists of 44 dually traded stocks, except in section II(d) where we compare transaction costs for which there were only 32 usable pairs. The stocks in the sample have the largest volume of transactions and hence a higher degree of liquidity compared to others. The period under study is from January 2005 to August 2007, a time characterized by a higher volume of trading and three short subperiods of significant market declines. Our data include daily closing stock prices as well as the volume for each stock. We carry out an econometric analysis on the first log price differences of daily closing prices (daily returns) to ensure that the time series remains stationery.
The literature shows that most studies employ an error correction model to determine the exchanges' contribution to the price discovery process, using high frequency data and transactions or quotes, with a minimum time interval. Such studies have focused on stocks such as IBM, which are very heavily traded on the highly liquid and active US stock exchanges. High frequency data is used to test for pricing dynamics across markets for two reasons. First, cointegration models are meant to capture "long-run" equilibrium relationships wherein time series can diverge temporarily from but then readjust to long-run cointegrated patterns. These short-term divergences may not be detected if the observation intervals are long and the adjustment process fast; daily stock price data may not detect the error correction from higher frequency trading. Second, the reaction of market participants to price differentials can be detected accurately only when the matched trades observed are synchronous across the exchanges. When trades are not time aligned, the parameters will not be efficiently estimated. Unfortunately, equivalent high frequency data is not available or feasible in the case of many emerging markets due to thin trading: when shorter intervals are considered, the incidence of nontrade increases. On the other hand, the use of daily closing prices instead (as in this study) may introduce some unspecified bias or noise, which should qualify our conclusions.
The effect of non-or thin trading on the portfolios has been widely studied. Thin and asynchronous trading appears to induce a spurious positive autocorrelation in stock portfolios: if one stock trades less frequently than the other, new information is impounded first into the more frequently traded stock price and then into the less traded stock price with a lag. This lag produces positive serial correlation in portfolios of stocks, although Lo and Mackinlay (1988) among others show the nontrading effect to be small. 4 The effects of thin and nonsynchronous trading on individual stock returns, particularly for dually traded stocks, have not been widely explored except that successive transactions are likely to take place at bid-and-ask prices and induce a negative serial correlation (Roll 1984) . Boudoukh, Richardson, and Whitelaw (1994) show that spurious autocorrelations induced by nontrading are aggravated if there is heterogeneity in the nontrading probabilities across stocks and in the covariances with the market portfolio. In the context of the same stock trading on multiple exchanges, there is likely to be homogeneity with respect to the above two conditions, considering that information flow (thus trading) is clustered within the trading day. Hence, relatively thin trading on one exchange may not show up seriously as cross-serial correlation with the same stock on the other exchange.
In using daily closing prices, we note that the "closing price" generally refers to the last price at which a stock trades during a regular trading session. However, it has been the practice in Pakistan to record the average of bid-ask quotes as the closing price in the absence of a trade.
5 Since quotes can be updated more frequently, they reflect current information and may attenuate the problems associated with nontrading. In any case, the market that happens to have relatively infrequent trades (the LSE in this case) will tend to have last-sale prices that were the most obsolete and therefore the least informative. To the extent that reported LSE prices may be stale, the role of the LSE would be understated. Subject to the above mentioned reservations, the results in the next section show that our models are able to obtain the expected long-run cointegrating equilibrium of price equality across the two exchanges, and capture the short-term adjusting dynamics.
B. Informational Efficiency
A stock market must be able to generate timely and accurate price signals by efficiently producing, processing, and disseminating information. The concept of market efficiency reflects the extent to which the available information is incorporated in stock prices. Fama (1970) classifies market efficiency into three forms: (i) weak, (ii) semi-strong, and (iii) strong, depending on whether the market is efficient with respect to (i) the information contained in the series of past prices, (ii) publicly available information, and (iii) all available information whether public or private. The efficiency of weak forms of the KSE and LSE is tested here by examining (i) auto-correlation structure in returns, and (ii) time dependency in return volatility.
Autocorrelation Structure
Weak form efficiency, which implies that there is no predictability in historical stock returns, is tested by examining the presence of serial dependence in stock returns. The autocorrelation functions are estimated for the "stock return" defined as the first log difference of the closing stock price, P t :
A significant auto-correlation coefficient indicates serial dependence. Positive serial correlation means that stock prices adjust slowly to the arrival of new information, while negative serial correlation might arise for thinly traded securities with wide fluctuations around the intrinsic value.
Tables-A1 and A2 (see appendix) report the estimated serial correlation for sample stocks traded on the KSE and LSE, respectively, for 8 lag-days. The last two columns report the Ljung-Box Q-statistic and the associated significance level (p-value). A summary of the autocorrelations test for the KSE and LSE stock is presented below in Table- The table shows that, of the 44 companies traded on the KSE, 25 stocks (56.8%) show significant serial correlation up to eight lags. 6 For the LSE stocks, of 44 stocks, 26 (or 59%) exhibit significant serial correlation. Although both stock exchanges exhibit predictability in stock returns, hence rejecting weak-form efficiency or the random walk model, the overall incidence of autocorrelation in the two stock exchanges is similar. It is worth noting that, in Pakistan's case, stock returns exhibit significant positive serial correlation in contrast to developed markets, where at the individual stock level, autocorrelations have been reported as generally negative but insignificant.
In order to directly compare the informational efficiency of the two stock exchanges, we paired the correlation coefficients (for eight lags) for each stock traded on both exchanges. The following regression was estimated:
,2 … 44, and k=1,2 … 8
Here ρ LSE, i,k and ρ KSE, i,k are correlation coefficients for stock i, and for k lags (up to 8) and for 44 pairs of coefficients. If the stock trading on the two stock exchanges is equally efficient in the weak form, then we should expect to see the values for the autocorrelation coefficients, ρ LSE, i,k and ρ KSE, i,k , to be statistically equal, which would imply that the intercept equals zero and the slope coefficient equals one, i.e., E[β 0 ] = 0, and E[β 1 ] = 1. Results for the cross-exchange regression of autocorrelations are reported in Table- 3. While the intercept is not significantly different from zero, the slope coefficient is 0.8038 and highly significant, implying that the typical autocorrelation on the LSE is only about 80% that of the KSE. The lower level of predictability in the LSE stocks implies that the LSE is relatively more efficient in the weak-form sense (or rather, less market-inefficient).
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The test for the null hypothesis that the slope coefficient equals one, β 1 =1.0, is strongly rejected; the t-statistic is -7.74, compared to a critical tvalue of 2.59 at a 1% level of significance. It should be noted that the presence of statistically significant autocorrelation does not mean that it is also financially significant, testing for which is beyond the scope of this paper. 
Analysis of Time Dependence in Volatility
Stock price behavior on the two stock exchanges is further investigated by examining the presence of conditional autoregressive heteroskedasticity (GARCH) effects in the stocks traded on the exchanges. Autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity was proposed by Engle (1982) to explain the tendency of large residuals to cluster together. We employ a generalized GARCH-M(1,1) model (Engle, Lilien, and Robins [1987] ) to account for the persistence in volatility in the returns series as follows:
Tables-A3 and A4 (see appendix) report results from the estimation of the GARCH-M model for KSE and LSE stocks, respectively. Table-4 summarizes the number and percentage of statistically significant coefficients from the estimation of the model. The "mean" coefficient relates to (γ) in the GARCH mean equation (1) and the coefficients C, A, and B, corresponding to the GARCH variance equation (2).
As can be seen from the table, the incidence of GARCH effects is similar in both markets. Specifically, the percentage of stocks with GARCH coefficients statistically significant at conventional 10% level is close in both exchanges. Respectively for the KSE and LSE, coefficient C is significant for 93% and 100% of stocks, coefficient A is significant for 98% and 91% of stocks, and coefficient B is statistically for 84% and 82% of stocks. Hence, stocks at both exchanges exhibit significant GARCH effects to a similar extent. The presence of statistical significant GARCH effects, however, does not mean that these afford financially feasible arbitrage opportunities. 
C. Comparative Transaction Costs
In stock trading, traders incur transaction costs that may be classified as either explicit or implicit (execution costs). Researchers have used different measures of execution costs and compared these estimates across markets (e.g., Roll 1984 , Berkowitz, Logue and Noser 1988 , Stoll 1989 , Chan and Lakonishok 1993 , Hasbrouck 1993 , and Choi, et al 1988 . Broadly, two different measures of transaction (or execution) costs have been used: (i) quoted bid-ask spreads, and (ii) effective bid-ask spreads. In a dealer market, transactions take place at the quoted bid or ask prices. Appropriately, the quoted bid-ask spreads have been used as measures of the transaction cost (see, for example, Demsetz 1968 , Branch and Freed 1977 , Benston and Hagerman 1974 , Huang and Stoll 1996 , and Barclay, et al 1999 . Security transactions, however, frequently take place inside the spread. In this case, the quoted spread will tend to overstate investors' expected trading costs. A better measure for trading costs would, therefore, be the effective spread or simply the average difference between the price at which a dealer sells at one point in time and buys at an earlier point in time, (e.g., Roll 1984 and Stoll 1985) . Applications of this effective spread method to measure trading costs have been used in numerous studies. Petersen and Fialkowski (1994) estimate the spread generated for orders submitted by retail brokers and those submitted electronically to the NYSE. They find a significant difference between the posted spread and effective spread.
The LSE and KSE are both order-driven markets, i.e., orders are executed as they arrive and are matched, and quoted bid and ask prices are not available. We, therefore, use the methodology suggested by Roll (1984) to compute the implicit effective bid-ask spread from the transaction prices. Roll (1984) shows that, because of trading costs, successive observed transactions price changes are negatively correlated despite the random walk behavior of the efficient price of a stock in a perfect market. On this basis, Roll (1984) derives the covariance between successive price changes as Cov(ΔP t , ΔP t-1 ) = -s 2 /4, where the Cov(ΔP t , ΔP t-1 ) term represents the firstorder serial covariance of transaction price changes and s the effective bidask spread. The estimated value of s is a dollar-weighted average spread faced by investors who trade at the observed prices rather than at the quoted bid-ask spread and is thus an appropriate measure of trading cost. The estimated effective bid-ask spread Ŝ j can be written as follows: Roll (1984) shows that the covariances of stock prices in an efficient market are expected to be negative because of the quick adjustments of quotes around the efficient price by market makers. In empirical research, however, most of the covariances computed using daily price data turn out to be positive, for which Roll's (1984) measure cannot be computed. Roll (1984) and Harris (1990) explain that if the stock market is less than fully efficient, the speed of price adjustment tends to be slower and results in positive correlation in daily prices rather than the theoretical negative serial correlation. When longer time intervals are used, the number of stocks with positive covariances tends to fall and more negative correlations are expected as price adjustments take place.
For most of the stocks in the sample, the covariances computed using daily data turned out to be positive and, therefore, unusable. When we used weekly data, we were able to obtain negative covariances for 32 of 44 stocks in the sample. The following steps were used to estimate the effective bid-ask spread:
i)
The sample comprises 44 pairs of dually listed stocks. ii)
Weekly returns are computed by taking the first log differences of the weekly closing stock prices, R t =ln(P t ) -ln(P t-1 ). iii)
Serial covariances for each stock are computed as Cov(R t , R t-1 ). iv)
The square roots of negative covariances, sqrt(-Cov(R t , R t-1 )), are then multiplied by 200 to convert all measurements into percentages. The covariances of weekly transaction prices for each stock and the effective bid-ask spreads computed as above are reported in Table-A5 (see  appendix) . As expected, when weekly prices are used, 32 KSE stocks and 33 LSE stocks exhibit negative covariances. Of 44 stocks, we have 32 usable pairs of estimates of which 16 or exactly one half have lower bid-ask spreads on the KSE than the LSE. This suggests that transaction costs on the two exchanges are similar. The mean effective bid-ask spread is 4.04 percent and 4.31 percent of the stock price on the KSE and LSE, respectively, while the mean bid-ask spread ratio is 1.00, suggesting that the bid-ask spread on the two exchanges is about the same. A formal t-test for the mean difference, reported in Table- 5, fails to reject the null hypothesis of equality of means of the spread between the two exchanges.
D. Competitive and Fragmentation Effects
Trading on multiple exchanges can have two opposite effects. The first is a competitive effect, i.e., trading on multiple exchanges will likely motivate the exchanges to supply better or cheaper transactions. Specialists are also likely to trade more against price movements, damping stock price volatility. The second is a fragmentation effect: trading on more than one exchange "fragments" the total market by reducing the trading volume for every exchange and reducing exchange efficiency due to loss of economies of scale. The effect of increasing multiple exchange trading might, therefore, be to increase competition but reduce exchange efficiency. Therefore, the public policy towards multiple exchanges should consider the tradeoff between the fragmentation and competitive effects. A consideration of such a tradeoff has been an argument for establishing common trading platforms. Its proponents believe that these platforms would reduce the tradeoff by preserving competition among the exchanges, and by centralizing the transacting of listed stocks, quotations, and reporting in a computerized system to help achieve greater economies of scale.
In order to estimate the competitive and fragmentation effect of LSE trading on the effective spread on the KSE, we run three multiple regression models as follows:
Spread LSE, i = β 0 + β 1 LTO i + β 2 PCLSE i + ε i (4)
Where for each stock i, LTO i is the volume of trade on the LSE, PCLSE i is the percentage of the total trading volume that takes place on the LSE, Spread KSE,i and Spread LSE,i are the effective bid-ask spreads on the KSE and the LSE respectively, and, KOL i is the relative effective bid-ask spread on the two stock exchanges (i.e., KOL= Spread KSE,i /Spread LSE,i ).
The percentage of the total trading volume that takes place on the LSE (PCLSE) is expected to depress spreads on both the LSE and KSE due to the fragmentation effect, but PCLSE may also reduce the relative spread due to the competitive effect. The bid-ask spread would be negatively impacted by the trade volume in any case and is controlled for by including LTO. The null hypotheses in the three models would be that H 0 : β 1 = β 2 = 0, indicating no impact of LSE trading on the bid-ask spread either on the KSE or on the LSE. The alternative hypotheses in equations (3) and (4) are that the higher volume would decrease the spread while the fragmentation effect would increase it (H A : β 1 <0, β 2 > 0). In model (5) the expected sign for β 1 may be positive or negative and is negative for β 2 .
All three models are estimated using weighted least squares (weighting series: LTO), with White Heteroskedasticity, Consistent Standard Errors and Covariance. 8 The results from the three regression models are reported in Tables-6, There is a negative relationship between the bid-ask spread on the KSE and the trading volume on the LSE, meaning that a higher volume leads to a lower spread (transaction costs) at the KSE, an expected effect of higher volume. At the same time, the coefficient on the relative LSE volume (PCLSE) is positive, indicating the fragmentation effect of the higher relative volume at the LSE. Table-6 shows the results of regressing the LSE bid-ask spread on the explanatory variables LTO and PSLSE. The coefficients are statistically significant (p-values 0.0624 and 0.0018, respectively) and carry the expected signs. There is a negative relationship between the bid-ask spread on the LSE and the trading volume on the LSE, implying that a higher volume leads to a lower spread at the LSE. At the same time, the coefficient on the relative LSE volume (PCLSE) is positive, indicating the fragmentation effect of the relatively high volume at the LSE. Table- 6, Panel C, takes the relative spread (KOL) as the dependent variable and the volume on the LSE (LTO) and relative LSE volume (PCLSE) as the explanatory variables. The coefficient on LTO is no longer significant (although is still negative) at the conventional 10% level. However, the coefficient on the PCLSE is significant and negative, indicating that an increase in the relative volume traded on the LSE leads to a reduction in the relative spread, KOL. From the estimation of models (3) and (4), it appears that a higher volume traded at the LSE decreases the spread both at the KSE as well as at the LSE. However, as the estimated model (5) shows, due to the competitive effect, the decrease in the spread on the KSE is greater than that on the LSE, causing the relative spread (KOL) to decrease. The fragmentation effect captured in models (3) and (4) is to increase the spread while controlling for the effect of volume. It seems to imply that the LSE exerts appreciable competitive pressure on transaction costs, but that the some fragmentation effect leads to higher transaction costs. 
E. Market Integration and Cross Dependence
In countries with multiple stock exchanges, a key question is whether or not the market is integrated: reflecting the full and timely communication of inter-market information. In a fully integrated market, trade orders have an opportunity to be matched against the best available corresponding orders across all locations. Market integration lowers the execution costs and time delays in trading and enhances the market's price efficiency.
This section examines the interrelationship between the KSE and LSE. The first subsection examines the incidence of Granger causality between the two exchanges. The second subsection explores the long-term relationship in price movements across exchanges by employing an error correction model (ECM), which is further used in the third subsection to look at the short-term dynamics of stock returns between the exchanges, and in the fourth subsection to estimate the contribution of each exchange in price discovery by variance decomposition.
Granger Causality
We start looking at the interrelationship between the KSE and LSE by examining the Granger causality between the two exchanges. The Granger (1969) approach to the question of whether x causes y is to see how much of the current y can be explained by past values of y and then to see whether adding lagged values of x can improve the explanatory power; y is said to be Granger-caused by x if x helps in the prediction of y, or equivalently if the coefficients on the lagged x's are statistically significant. Granger causality measures precedence and information content but does not by itself indicate causality in the more common use of the term. To test for Granger causality, we run bivariate regressions of the following form:
x t = α 0 + α 1 x t-1 +…+ α l x t-l + β 1 y +…+ β l y t-l
for all possible pairs of (x,y) series in the group, including up to l lags. The reported F-statistics are the Wald statistics for the joint hypothesis: β 1 = … = β l = 0, for each equation. The null hypothesis, therefore, is that x does not Granger-cause y in the first regression and that y does not Grangercause x in the second regression.
The Granger causality test results are reported in Table- A6 (appendix). The tests are conducted on stock returns of 44 paired stocks traded at both exchanges for two lags. Of the 44 stocks, 10 do not exhibit statistically significant Granger causality. Five stocks show evidence of significant bi-directional causality. For 21 stocks, it shows that the KSE Granger-causes the LSE, while 8 stocks show the direction of causality from the LSE to the KSE. From the LSE perspective, 13 stocks out of 44 indicate that the causality direction is from the LSE to the KSE or runs in both directions. The analysis seems to suggest that, although the information flow is predominantly from the KSE to the LSE, for a substantial proportion of stocks (29.5% of the sample) the information flow takes place from the LSE to the KSE.
Long-Term Inter-Exchange Relationship: Cointegration Tests
The long-term relationship between stock returns on the KSE and LSE are studied employing cointegration analysis, which is useful in detecting any long-term relationship between time series variables (e.g., many macroeconomic variables) that may be nonstationary (Engle and Granger 1987) . We use an ECM to test the long-term relationship between stock returns on stocks traded on both exchanges. A vector error correction (VEC) representation of the model is a restricted VAR that has the cointegration restrictions built into the specifications. Endogenous variables are restricted in the VEC representation so that they converge on their cointegrating relationships in the long run. At the same time, it allows a wide range of short-run deviations from the long-run equilibrium, which are corrected through a series of partial short-run adjustments. Johansen's method tests restrictions imposed by cointegration on the unrestricted VAR model.
We hypothesize a simple long-term relationship between the exchanges, without an intercept or a trend with one cointegrating equation and two lagged difference terms as follows:
ΔR LSE,t = γ 2 (R LSE,t-1 -βR KSE,t-1 ) + δ 1 ΔR KSE,t-1 + δ 2 ΔR KSE,t-2 + λ 1 ΔR LSE,t-1 + λ 2 ΔR LSE,t-2 + ε 2,t
The term γ i (R LSE,t-1 -βR KSE,t-1 ) is the error correction term representing the long-term relationship, and coefficients γ 1 and γ 2 may be considered the speed of adjustment parameters. The cointegrating equation is: R KSE,t = βR LSE,t . The error correction term in a long-run equilibrium is zero. However, if R KSE and R lSE deviate from the long-run equilibrium in the last period, the error correction term is nonzero and the returns will adjust to partially restore the equilibrium relation.
The results of the cointegration tests are reported in Table-A7 (appendix). The null hypothesis of "none", i.e. no cointegrating equation, CE(s), and the null hypothesis of "at most 1" CE(s) is rejected for all stocks in the sample. The Log Likelihood Ratio test indicates two cointegrating equations at a 5% significance level, implying that the returns on the stocks traded on the two exchanges exhibit a long-term relationship.
Short-Term Inter-Exchange Dynamics
The long-term relationship in the ECM is "disturbed" by short-term deviations from the equilibrium. The dynamics of the short-term adjustment process can be captured by the same ECM equations (8 and 9) that were introduced in the previous section. For the ECM to hold, at least one of the γ i 's must be significant. If both the coefficients (γ i ) are significant, it implies that both series influence each other or that there is a feedback relationship between the two. If only one of the error term coefficients (γ i ) is significant, it implies that one market is driving the other toward long-term equilibrium, but not the other way around. The sign on the error term coefficient (γ i ) should be negative for the previous period's positive (negative) deviation to lead to negative (positive) correction in the current period and drive it toward equilibrium.
The lagged terms of the change in returns, ΔR KSE,t-l and ΔR LSE,t-l , included as independent variables, indicate a short-run dynamic (or causeand-effect) relationship between the two markets. If the lagged coefficient of ΔR KSE is significant in the regression of ΔR LSE , or ΔR KSE significantly affects ΔR LSE , it would indicate that KSE stock returns affect the returns on the LSE. Similarly, if the lagged coefficient of ΔR LSE is significant in the regression of ΔR KSE , we can infer that LSE stock returns affect the returns on the KSE. If neither lagged coefficient is significant, then no interexchange "cause-and-effect" relationship can be inferred.
The detailed results from estimating the ECM are reported in Table- A8 (see appendix). The coefficients of the cointegration equation (β i ) are highly significant (p-values < 0.01) for all stocks in the sample with a value close to negative one, except for one with a positive but insignificant coefficient. Of the 44 stocks, 16 (or 36%) of the coefficients on the error correction term (γ 1 and γ 2 ) are significant in both the ECM equations, indicating a bi-directional relationship between the two markets. A summary of these results is provided in Table-7, which shows that in the ECM equation (8) for ∆KSE-returns, in the case of 24 stocks (55%) the LSE seems to exert a significant influence on the KSE at a lag of 1 day. For 23 (52%) stocks, the influence of the LSE is also at the 2-lag interval. On the other hand, for equation (9) for ∆LSE-returns, 17 and 13 stocks (39% and 30%) traded on the KSE impact the LSE stocks respectively at a lag of 1 day and 2 days, respectively. 
F. Contribution of Exchanges in Price Discovery: Variance Decomposition
When securities are traded on multiple platforms, arbitrage ensures that price differences between markets do not diverge without bound. The transaction prices on different exchanges share a common implicit efficient price that is defined statistically as the random-walk component of the observed prices. The innovation variance in this random walk is a measure of the information intensity of the efficient price process. Hasbrouck (1991) defines the information share of a market as the proportion of this innovation variance that can be attributed to that market and provides a method of depicting the system dynamics by decomposing variation in an endogenous variable into the component shocks.
Following the estimation of the ECM for each dually traded stock, a variance decomposition analysis was performed to extract the proportion of information attributable to each exchange. The results of the variance decomposition are reported in Tables-A9 and A10 (see appendix) , which show the percentage share contribution of the LSE to the variation in the innovation of long-memory trend. The decomposition of variance depends critically on the ordering of equations. Therefore, Table-A9 shows the decomposition of the variance of stock returns on the KSE, given that the innovation originates in the LSE (i.e., ordering: LRET→KRET). The table reports that percentage of the variance that is attributable to the LSE. It reports the percentage of the variance attributable to the LSE when the source of innovation is KSE (Ordering: KRET→ LRET).
The variance decomposition indicates that the price discovery attributable to the LSE varies from stock to stock, but on average about 4.70% of the price discovery takes place in the LSE at a 1-day interval. The maximum relative price discovery is 21% and the minimum is 0.22%. The results show that the LSE contributes to price discovery to a noticeable extent, implying that some additional information is being generated at the LSE and brought to bear on the market.
IV. Summary and Conclusions
A comprehensive econometric analysis was performed to assess the comparative performance of the LSE in discharging its basic economic role as a stock exchange in terms of relative market efficiency, transaction costs, its contribution to price discovery, and the extent of market integration. We obtain the following results:
Overall, the degree of market efficiency depicted by the pattern of autocorrelation for the two stock exchanges is quite similar. The incidence of conditional auto-regressive heteroskedasticity (GARCH) is also comparable.
(ii) A comparison of effective bid-ask spreads shows that there is no statistically significant difference in the mean transaction costs on the two exchanges.
(iii) There is evidence of both a competitive effect and a fragmentation effect from LSE trading on the bid-ask spread on the KSE.
(iv) The Granger causality test and cointegration analysis seems to suggest that, although the information flow occurs predominantly from the KSE to the LSE, for a substantial number of stocks the information flow takes place from the LSE to the KSE. The results depict a long-term equilibrium relationship for all the stocks in the sample. For the majority of stocks in the sample, the LSE seems to exert a significant influence on the KSE at a 1-day and 2-day lag.
(v) The extent of price discovery attributable to the LSE varies from stock to stock, but is about 4.70% on average.
Our econometric analysis suggests that the LSE is at par with the KSE in terms of informational efficiency and transaction costs. The evidence also indicates informational linkages and interdependencies between the two markets, suggesting an integrated market. The LSE appears to contribute to price discovery to an appreciable extent and to exerting competitive pressure on the KSE. Overall, our evidence presents a picture in which the LSE plays an active and competitive role.
These findings have implications for consolidation or merger decisions which may be in the interest of exchange members but not in the best public interest, thus pointing to the need for caution in that respect. With the probable merger of the Lahore and Islamabad stock exchanges with the KSE, one concern is that the current competitive environment will disappear and the emergent monopolist market may have adverse consequences for the country's capital markets. These could include higher transaction costs, less incentive for regulatory compliance and less incentive for the exchanges to play an active role in capital market development. The concentration of economic power may also lead to discriminatory practices and business abuses. A for-profit exchange, especially a monopoly, may even withdraw from the upcountry and regional market segments if considered not sufficiently profitable. Pakistan's regional stock exchanges have been regarded the hub of the financial sector and their presence is still likely to be conducive to the growth of regional financial service centers, especially in an economy where financial and business deals are based more on trust, personal networks, and communication. Table- Table- Table- (5) Relative spread is the KSE spread divided by the LSE spread (6) the bid-ask spreads are in percentage of the stock prices (7) The estimated bid-asks spread is S j =200x-Cov j , where Cov j is the serial-covariance of returns on stock j. 
